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ABSTRACT 
One of the basic claims of relevance theory is that because a communicator asks for the 
attention of the addressee, the addressee is entitled to assume that the communicator is 
trying to be relevant, and interpret an utterance according to this expectation. This paper 
addresses the question of what the consequences of this claim are for a model on on-line 
input processing, and proposes a model in which addressees interpret utterances in 
accordance with the principie of relevance, by building anticipatory hypotheses about the 
overall propositional form of the utterance. It is shown how this proposal can account for 
psycholinguistic findings concerning disambiguation, and for the interpretation of centre 
embedded sentences. 
1. Introduction 
In most existing psycholinguistic models of sentence input processing little or no account 
is taken of the fact that the use of natural language is a process of interaction between 
communicator and addressee. Many psycholinguists nave tried to explain input processing 
purely in terms of the addressee's activity, without taking into account that the 
communicator is responsible for the input. However, relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson, 
1986, 1995) shows that natural language use is more than the use of a 'context-neutral' 
language with the context added: the choice of a particular utterance is a consequence of 
the context in which it is uttered. Sperber & Wilson argüe that communicators intend their 
audience to believe that they are worth paying attention to, and that addressees only pay 
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attention to information which seems relevant to them, so that a communicator will aim at 
optimal relevance (i.e. the communicator will aim at causing the addressee to compute an 
adequate range of contextual effects for a minimal amount of processing effort). It follows 
from this that a communicator will try to keep processing cost down by accommodating 
her/his choice of linguistic output to the processing needs of the addressee. This view of 
communicator/addressee interaction has consequences for a model on input processing, 
because it forces us to look atthe interpretation process as a process in which the addressee 
expects the communicator to be aiming at optimal relevance, and in which s/he will interpret 
an utterance according to this expectation. 
Based on this view, I will present an account of some of the mental mechanisms and 
processes that take the addressee from a linguistic input to the full pragmatic interpretation 
of that input. In section (2) the proposals made by relevance theory with regard to on-line 
interpretation are discussed, and it is shown how the proposal that during on-line 
interpretation we make anticipatory hypotheses concerning the propositional form of an 
utterance can be made more precise. On the basis of this, section (3) introduces an account 
of on-line processing which takes as its starting point that the interpretation an addressee 
selects is a consequence of expectations of relevance. A refinement of the notion of 
'processing effort' is introduced and it is shown how on the basis of this we can account for 
experimental findings concerning disambiguation, and for the various degrees of difficulty 
experienced in processing múltiple centre-embedded sentences. 
2. Relevance and on-line processing 
The psycholinguistic literature on (post-lexical) processing is primarily concerned with how 
linguistic syntactic representations are constructed on-Hne. However, linguistic syntactic 
representations are at most half-way stations in the interpretation process. In order to 
account for how people recover the full semantic/pragmatic meaning of an utterance, we 
need, atleast, an account of how an addressee computes conceptual representations on the 
basis of the linguistic input. There is, as yet, litüe psycholinguistic theorisation of pragmatic 
aspects of interpretation. This may be partly due to the fact that pragmatics has been mostly 
concerned with implicatures, rather than with working out the propositional content of an 
utterance (e.g. Grice, 1975; Levinson, 1983). However, Wilson & Sperber (1981) and 
Sperber & Wilson (1986, 1995) show that pragmatics does not only play a role in 
recovering what is implicated, but also in recovering what is explicitly communicated. 
Processes such as reference assignment, disambiguation, and recovery of elliptical material 
involve interaction between input and context, guided by pragmatics. 
The basic claim of relevance theory is that in processing information, people try to 
achieve the greatest cognitive effect for the smallest amount of processing effort, i.e. that 
human cognition is chiven by relevance and the maximisation of relevance, where relevance 
to an individual can be defined as follows: 
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"Extent condition 1: an assumption is relevant to an individual to the extent that the 
contextual effects achieved when it is optimally processed are large. 
Extent condition 2: an assumption is relevant to an individual to the extent that the 
effort required toprocess it optimally is small." (Sperber & Wilson, 1986: 145). 
Sperber & Wilson propose that there are three types of contextual effects: strengthenings, 
where new information causes a person to have more confidence in an assumption already 
(weakly) held; contradictions, where new information contradicts an existing assumption, 
causing the existing assumption to be eliminated; and contextual implications, which are 
implications derived from a new assumption together with assumptions in the context. 
To account for how this general notion of relevance helps explain ostensive 
communication, Sperber & Wilson propose that utterance interpretation is governed rjy the 
Principie of Relevance, which states that: 
"Every actof ostensive communication communicates the presumption ofits own optimal 
relevance." (158). 
An utterance is optimally relevant when it enables the addressee to derive an adequate 
number of contextual effects for no unjustifiable processing effort. 
In order to derive contextual effects, a context has to be found against which the 
utterance is to be processed. Because relevance theory proposes that an utterance 
communicates the presumption ofits own optimal relevance, the addressee can assume that 
the relevance of an utterance is given, and therefore need not be assessed. The task of the 
addressee is rather to select a context which bears out this guarantee of relevance of the 
utterance. How is this context selected? Sperber & Wilson propose that at the start of 
processing some new item of information there is an initial context consisting of 
assumptions left over in the memory of the deductive device from the immediately 
preceding deductive process. This initial context can be extended in different ways during 
the interpretation process. One way of extending the context is to add assumptions used or 
derived in previous deductive processes. A second way is to add assumptions stored under 
the encyclopaedic entries of concepts already present in the context or in the assumption 
being processed (see Groefsema (1995a)). A third way of extending the context is to add to 
it information about the immediately observable environment. However, extending the 
context involves processing effort, which means that an addressee cannot freely access all 
kinds of different extensions, because this would diminish the overall relevance of the 
assumption being processed. 
This proposal gives the following picture of the comprehension process. The linguistic 
inputmaps onto an (incomplete) conceptual representation (a non-linguistic logical form). 
At points where the logical form is incomplete (for example, where reference has to be 
assigned), this logical form has to be enriched into a fully propositional form. This logical 
form does not have to be recovered completely before any enrichments can take place. 
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Processes such as reference assignment, disambiguation, and recovery of elliptical material 
occur on-line, in accordance with the principie of relevance. Given that each cycle of 
context extensión involves additional processing effort, the addressee will select the most 
accessible valué, consistent with the principie of relevance, in each case. It follows from this 
that the first interpretation found consistent with the principie of relevance is the only 
interpretation consistent with the principie of relevance: any further interpretation which 
would yield contextual effects would automatically falsify the second part of the definition 
of relevance, because it would involve more processing effort. 
Sperber & Wilson propose that, in order to save a hearer from going through a lot of 
fruitless processing, a speaker aiming at optimal relevance phrases her/his utterance in such 
a way as to facilítate early, and correct disambiguation, reference assignment, and 
enrichment. This raises the question of how a speaker can anticipate the way in which a 
hearer is going to interpret an utterance. Sperber & Wilson propose that the hearer makes 
anticipatory hypotheses about the overall logical form of the utterance, and that s/he 
resolves potential ambiguities and mdetemünacies on the basis of these hypotheses. By 
virtue of being a hearer as well as a speaker, the speaker can anticipate what hypotheses the 
hearer is going to make, and structure his/her utterance accordingly.1 
Sperber & Wilson assume that logical forms are "trees oflabelled nodes (...) which 
should be a set of logical categories, perhaps from afbced range which is part of human 
mental equipment, which might be regarded as variables over conceptual representations 
ofdifferenttypes." (Sperber & Wilson, 1986:205). 
As a simplified illustration of the logical form of a sentence such as (la) they give (Ib): 
(l)(a) John invited Lucy 
(1 )(b) SOMETHING IS THE CASE 
SOMEONE DID SOMETHING 
JOHN invited SOMEONE 
I 
Lucy 
Sperber & Wilson argüe that, viewed in this way, the logical form of (la) carries the 
information that John did something, that John invited someone, etc.; in other words, a 
number of analytic implications of (la) can be read off the logical form representation 
directly. 
The question then arises how hearers construct these anticipatory logical hypotheses. One 
possibility (put forward by Sperber & Wilson) is to postúlate that the hearer builds these 
anticipatory logical hypotheses on the basis of anticipatory syntactic hypotheses, by variable 
substitution. However, this proposal laces a number of problems. In the first place, it is not 
clear on what basis and how the syntactic hypotheses are formed, whether these are built for 
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each word, for example, or only for major phrases (see Groefsema (1992) for an extended 
evaluation of this problem). In the second place, it is not clear which variable will be 
substituted for which syntactic categories. For example, on encountering (2) we can build 
the syntactic hypothesis tiaatput can be followed by an NP and a PP: 
(2) Mary put the book on the table. 
However, a PP can express concepts of different sorts of conceptual categories (cf. 
Jackendoff, 1983, 1990), such as a property 'with big ears,' a time 'at five o'clock,' a 
manner 'by car,' and a place 'on the table.' In principie, these different categories could 
give rise to different logical hypotheses. The problem with this is that often these hypotheses 
would be superfluous, in that they would never actually be reaHsed, and moreover, they 
miss the point that by virtue of its meaning/?M¿ involves a place where something is put. 
Moreover, the linguistic form of an utterance often underdetermines the conceptual 
representation the addressee constructs on the basis of the utterance (e.g. Blakemore, 1987; 
Carston, 1988; Groefsema, 1992, 1995a; Sperber & Wilson, 1986, 1995), as in the 
following examples (Carston, 1988: 165, 167), where we understand the linguistic input in 
(3a) and (4a) along the lines of (3b) and (4b) respectively: 
(3)(a) He ran to the edge of the cliff and jumped. 
(b) He ran to the edge of the cliff and jumped over the cliff. 
(4)(a) Susan's performance isn't good enough. 
(b) The way in which Susan performs something is not good enough for something. 
Ñor is the structure of the natural language input and the structure of the conceptual 
representation always isomorphic, as in examples (5) and (6) (Pustejovski, 1991: 424, 
426): 
(5) John began a novel. 
(= John began to read a novel, 
or: John began to write a novel) 
(6) John knows the plañe's arrival time. 
(= John knows what time the plañe will arrive) 
The proposal that anticipatory logical hypotheses are based on anticipatory syntactic 
hypotheses cannot account for how we formúlate the right logical hypotheses for any of 
these examples. 
The view that logical hypotheses are conceptual structures rather than linguistic 
structures allows for an alternative proposal. Postulating that the mind computes structured 
conceptual representations entails thatinformation aboutthe syntax of these representations 
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has to be stated somewhere. Sperber & Wilson propose that concepts consist of conceptual 
addresses which give access to different types of mformation, lexical, logical and 
encyclopaedic. This view of concepts allows for the proposal that one type of information 
that is stored under a conceptual address is information concerning what type of concepts 
the concept has to or can combine with to yield a well-formed conceptual structure, as a 
logical selection frame. Postulating this has as a consequence that we can account for how 
anticipatory logical hypotheses are built without having to appeal to anticipatory syntactic 
hypotheses: the phonological form of a lexical item maps onto a conceptual address (or 
different conceptual addresses in the case of ambiguity), which gives access to the logical 
entry of that concept. From this the addressee can recover the selection frame of the 
concept, and use this selection frame as an anticipatory hypothesis about the logical form 
of the utterance. 
Although Sperber & Wilson postúlate that fhere may be a set of conceptual categories 
which is part of basic human equipment, they do not specify what these conceptual 
categories are. Jackendoff (1983, 1990) proposes and defends a set of basic conceptual 
categories: THING, EVENT, STATE, ACTION, PLACE, PATH, PROPERTY, 
AMOUNT, and MANNER. He argües that we need to distinguish these categories as 
entities at the conceptual level because we can quantify over instances of them, point at 
instances of them, and question instances of them. Jackendoff leaves it open whether a 
category PREDÍCATE should be distinguished. However, Kempson (1988) shows that we 
need to postúlate a logical variable corresponding to a VP to account for VP anaphora (see 
also Groefsema (1995b) for arguments that we need a category PREDÍCATE). Adopting 
these categories gives us a basis for making Sperber & Wilson's proposals more precise.2 
Phonological forms of lexical items then map onto conceptual addresses which give 
access to different types of information, including selection information. For example, the 
conceptual address for the verb open gives access to the selection frame which specifies 
what the concept can combined with to form a complex concept:3,4 
r rOPENÍU^] 6 ) - ! 
UMANNER J l 
-PREDÍCATE 
UPROI'EKIY J} 
(LTHINGJ ) 
EVENT 
One can open a thing in a certain manner, for example, you can open a door quickly, which 
means that the PREDÍCATE can contain a MANNER to yield a complex PREDÍCATE, 
although it does not have to. Moreover, the event expressed by open can have a 
PROPERTY, such as that the opening of the door was done with a key, which means that 
the EVENT can contain a PROPERTY although it does not have to.5 
The conceptual address for open also gives access to a selection frame which specifies 
what the concept has to combine with to form a well-formed conceptual structure (i.e. a 
propositional form): 
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r LPLACE J LTIME JLEVENT _] "I 
Similarly, the conceptual address for girl will give access to the following selection frame: 
GIRL 
UPROPERTY J ) 
THING 
This frame tells us that the concept GIRL belongs to the category THING, which has to be 
individuated in some way to oceur as a constituent in conceptual structure (indicated by the 
índex a). Moreover, it tells us that GIRL can oceur with a PROPERTY, although it does not 
nave to. PROPERTIES modifying THINGS play a different role from, for example, 
PROPERTIES modifying EVENTS. Whereas PROPERTIES modifying EVENTS change 
the nature of the EVENT involved, PROPERTIES modifying THINGS help individúate the 
instance of the THING at stake. PROPERTIES modifying THINGS can be either concepts 
of the conceptual category PROPERTY, or they can be propositions, expressing an 
assumption about the THING at stake. 
The conceptual address for girl will also give access to a second selection frame which 
specifies what the concept has to combine with to form a well-formed conceptual structure 
(i.e. a propositional form): 
r LPLACE J LTIME J LEVENT/STATELPREDICATE JUTHING _ J)J 1 
We can make a distinction between concepts that oceur in conceptual structure and concepts 
that do not. This second type of concept has the function of constraining the interpretation 
of the utterance in some way. Within this second group of concepts we can distinguish 
different sorts of concepts. What they have in common is that none of them gives access to 
encyclopaedic information: their 'meaning' is exhausted by how they constrain the 
interpretation process. This means that they do not have a further role to play in general 
cognitive processes, and consequently they do not oceur in logical forms. For example, 
complementizer that signáis that a proposition is following, by which it constrains the 
possible logical hypothesis that can be built. In other words, that maps onto a conceptual 
address which gives access to the selection frames: 
LpROPOsrnoN J 
[" [PLACEJU'IME JLEVENT/STATELPREDICATE JVLPROPOSITION _ ])] 
PROPOSITION ] 
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The first frame simply says that a PROPOSITION is following, and the second frame 
specifies that it has to combine with certain categories to yield a well-formed conceptual 
structure. 
We also fmd concepts which do not themselves occur in conceptual structures, but 
whose 'meaning' is partly procedural, i.e. they give a procedure for the interpretation of 
some conceptual category (see e.g. Wilson & Sperber, 1993). An example of this is the 
indefinite article. What the indefinite article does is signal that an instance of a THING is 
atstake, i.e. it has associated with it a procedure for setting upa conceptofan instance of 
some THING. In line with the proposals made here, we can say that the conceptual address 
of the indefinite article will give access to the following selection frames: 
LTHING J 
(Procedure: créate instance) 
I" LPLACEJLTME JLEVENT/STATE LPREDICATE JCLTIIING _ l)J] "1 
PROPOSITION 
Similarly, Blakemore (1987) shows that discourse connectives should be analyzed as 
encoding procedures for the pragmatic computations a proposition may enter into. For 
example, she argües that the meaning of so is an instruction to interpret the proposition it 
introduces as a logical consequence of some other proposition. We can view discourse 
connectives as mapping onto concepts which give access to selection frames, which in tura 
give access to the procedure associated with the concept. 
3. A relevance-driven account of input processing 
I propose an account of on-line comprehension, in which the interpretation process is dri ven 
by the principie of relevance, and which takes into account that the input for comprehension 
is never 'neutral', but is produced by a communicator aiming at optimal relevance. 
In this model a linguistic processor is responsible for recognizing the phonological (or 
orthographic) form of a lexical item. The phonological (or orthographic) forms give access 
to the concepts associated with them, which in turn give access to the selection frames 
associated with the concepts. Based on these selection frames, anticipatory hypofheses are 
made regarding the logical form of the utterance. These hypofheses can be enriched by 
accessing the context and the encyclopaedic entries of concepts, in accordance with the 
principie of relevance, until a fully propositional form has been built. 
3.1. Processing effort 
As we have seen above relevance theory predicts that an addressee selects the interpretation 
which yields adequate contextual effects for as little processing effort as possible. The 
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different sorts of contextual effect are clearly defined by Sperber & Wilson. The question 
then is what constitutes processing effort. A partial answer to this question is provided by 
Üie relevance theory notion of accessible contexts. Relevance theory proposes that the 
interpretation of a linguistic input depends on its interaction with assumptions (the context) 
which are either already held in memory, or can be constructed from assumption schemas, 
to yield contextual effects. These assumptions and assumption schemas have to be retrieved 
from memory. The more accessible an assumption is, the easier it is to recall from memory. 
Relevance theory proposes that contexts are ordered according to accessibility, and that 
extending a context is a cyclic process, i.e. only some extended contexts are accessible from 
the immediate context, but these extended contexts make further extensions accessible, 
which in tura make further extensions accessible, etc. Actually accessing a context involves 
processing effort, and each step of context extensión involves more processing effort, so 
that from this we can conclude that the fewer steps of context extensión needed to yield an 
interpretation with adequate contextual effects, the smaller the processing effort. 
However, this is not all that needs to be said about processing effort. In many 
psycholinguistic experiments, ambiguous sentences such as in (7), and 'garden-path 
sentences' such as in (8), are presented to subjects in isolation, i.e. the 'nuil context': 
(7)(a) Joyce said Tom left yesterday. 
(b) John hit the girl with a book. 
(8)(a) Since Jay always jogs a mile seems like a short distance to him. 
(b) The horse raced past the barn fell. 
When these sentences are presented to subjects in isolation, they are not genuine acts of 
ostensive communication, i.e. they are not used to communicate propositions to the 
subjects. This means that selecting one rather than another interpretation is not going to give 
the subject more contextual effects, for example, knowing that Joyce said something 
yesterday does not give the subject more contextual effects than knowing that Tom left 
yesterday, if the subject does not know who Joyce and Tom are. Moreover, by formulating 
these sentences the researchers are not aiming at optimal relevance, i.e. they are not 
accommodating the choice of sentence to the processing needs of the subjects. A 
communicator actually uttering one of the sentences in (7) and (8) would only do so if the 
utterance is the most relevant s/he could use in order to communicate the proposition s/he 
wants to convey, i.e. when it accommodates the processing needs of the addressee best.. 
This means that experiments in which sentences are processed in isolation do not necessarily 
reflect normal utterance interpretation: the initial context in which the sentence is processed 
does not contain any assumptions that have a bearing on the interpretation, and the 
interpretation of the sentence will yield no or very little contextual effects. Even so, it has 
been found that ambiguous sentences, as in (7), have a favoured interpretation when 
processed in isolation, i.e. those in (9) (e.g. Ferreira & Clifton, 1986; Frazier, 1987): 
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(9)(a) Joyce said (Tom left yesterday). 
(b) John (hit (the girl)(with a book)). 
And the 'garden-path' sentences, as in (8), are called so because they cause subjects to select 
the wrong analysis. If we cannot account for this in terms of contextual effects, we will have 
to account for it in terms of processing effort. However, the difference in processing effort 
between the different analyses cannot be explained in terms of numbers of context 
extensions involved in the different interpretations, because extending the context does not 
make one interpretation more relevant than the other. 
We can explain this difference in processing effort by postulating that 'accessibility' 
applies to conceptual slots in logical hypotheses as well as to assumptions in the context. 
A conceptual slot is the most accessible (i.e. immediately accessible) when it is being 
inserted in a logical hypothesis, when it is being filled, and when a constraint is put on its 
interpretation. When new conceptual slots are inserted into the logical hypothesis they in 
tum become more accessible. We can think of accessibility in terms of activation: when a 
concept or conceptual slot is accessed it receives activation, thereby becoming more 
accessible, but when new concepts or conceptual slots are accessed activation on the earlier 
ones fedes away. This proposal does not mean that we can equate accessibility with 'having 
been postulated most recently' per se, because two conceptual slots of the same type may 
have the same level of activation if they are further up-stream in a logical hypothesis, even 
though one will have been postulated more recently than the other. 
Optional slots differ from the other slots in a logical hypothesis in that they do not have 
to be filled by any conceptual material in order to yield a well-formed representation: they 
merely show what a concept con combine with to form a complex concept, or, as is the case 
with PROPERTIES occurring with THINGS, they can help the addressee to pick out the 
THING at stake. This means that they do not become immediately accessible on being 
inserted in the hypothesis. Rather, optional slots become accessible either when the 
addressee recovers a concept of the same type which cannot be inserted into a non-optional 
slot, or they become accessible because they are activated by something in the context. 
Given this account of accessibility of conceptual slots, we can say that filling a 
conceptual slot involves least processing effort if the conceptual slot is immediately 
accessible. 
3.2. Disambiguation 
On the basis of the proposal that processing effort is defined both in terms of the 
accessibility of assumptions and the accessibility of conceptual slots in logical hypotheses, 
we can account for why the sentences in (7) and (8) are interpreted the way they are, when 
processed in isolation. As we saw above, when (7a) is processed in isolation, it is 
interpreted as (9a) rather than (9c): 
(9)(a) Joyce said (Tom left yesterday). 
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(c) Joyce said (Tom left) yesterday. 
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We can account for this preference as follows: when the addressee encounters Joyce, fhis 
will give access to the selection frames: 
rJOYCE 
UPROPERTY Sí 
[ [PLACE JLTIME HEVENT/STATEEPREDICATE ]([THING _ ])] 1 
PROPOSITION 
Because the addressee has not got a hypothesis yet about the logical form of the utterance, 
both selection frames need to be accessed. These selection frames yield the hypothesis: 
r LPLACEJLTIME J rL LPREDICATE JOYCE 
UPROPERTY ] } 
LTHING 
EVENT/STATE 
<- PROPOSITION 
Said gives access to the selection frames: 
SAY (LPROPOSITION i) ~ 
UMANNER1} 
PREDÍCATE 
UPROPERTY Sí 
(LTHINGJ ) 
[ LPLACE J L T I M E J L E V E N T _ J 
PROPOSITION 
] 
Since the addressee already has an anticipatory hypothesis available, only the first frame 
needs to be accessed, and the information can be unified with the existing hypothesis, giving 
rise to a further hypothesis. This is in accordance with the principie of relevance, since 
accessing both selection frames would give rise to extra processing effort, which would not 
be offset with an increase in contextual effects (in fact, the information in the second 
selection frame cannot be incorporated into the current hypothesis at all). Moreover, the 
past tense constrains the TIME to a time before time of utterance: 
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LPLACE-ILTIMF.:! < tu J - SAY (LPROPOSITION J)' 
UMANNER i) 
PREDÍCATE 
UPROPERTY J J 
PROPOSITION 
Tom gives access to the selection frames: 
r TOM 
UPROPERTY II 
rJOYCE 
UPROPERTY J } 
THING 
[ LPI.ACFJI.TIME H E V E :NT/STATELPREDICATE JUTHING ] ( [  .])] 
PROPOSITION 
] 
Because there is no THING slot available in the hypothesis, the first selection frame can't 
be incorporated in it, and the second frame needs to be accessed. Because there is a 
PROPOSITION slot available in the hypothesis, the information in the second frame can 
be unified with the existing hypothesis, yielding a fürther hypothesis:6 
~ LPLACF.JLTIME:! < tu J 
- PROPOSITION, 
- LPLACEJLTIME J 
- PROPOSITIO 
- SAY (lpROpoSITION2 J)" 
UMANNER 1} 
- PREDÍCATE 
UPROPERTY \) 
( 
rJOYCE 
UPROPERTY 1} 
- THING 
EVENT 
- LPREDICATE J / 
-EVE 
N, 
m /STATE 
rTOM -i 
UPROPERTY ] } 
- THING ) " 
On encountering left the PREDÍCATE slot can be filled by the information in its selection 
frame, and the past constrains the TIME slot in the subordínate PROPOSITION to a time 
before the time of utterance. This yields the following hypothesis: 
Ipl.ACE J LTI A ME: t < tu ] "SAY (LpROPOSITION2 J ) ' 
UMANNER ] } 
PREDÍCATE 
UPROPERTY J ) 
JOYCE 
UPROPERTY ] } 
L
 PROPOSITION, 
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LPLACEJLTIME:! < tu J 
•PROPOSITION, 
LEAVE([THIN0])n 
U M A N N E R ] / 
PREDÍCATE 
{[pROPERTY ]} 
TOM 
UPROPERTY ¡i 
On encountering YESTERDAY, this will be fitted into the most accessible TIME slot. The 
TIME slot in the subordínate PROPOSITION is the TIME slot postulated most recently, 
and moreover the tense of LEAVE has put a constraint on its interpretation immediately 
before YESTERDAY is encountered, so that it is more accessible than the TIME slot in the 
main clause. Because of this, the processor will not even consider the TIME slot in the main 
clause. Only if YESTERDAY is incompatible with conceptual material already available, 
for example in the case ofJoyce said Tom is leaving yesterday, or if it is incompatible with 
assumptions in the context, will this assignment be rejected, and the TIME slot in the main 
PROPOSITION tried. Because rejecting the first interpretation, and selecting the TIME slot 
in the main PROPOSITION would involved more processing effort, which is not offset by 
an increase in contextual effects, Joyce said (Tom left yesterday) is the most relevant 
interpretation, and therefore the interpretation that the addressee selects when processing 
(7a) in isolation. 
When (7b), repeated here, is processed in isolation, it is interpreted as (9b) rather than 
as (9d): 
(9)(b) John (hit (the girl)(with a book)). 
(d) John (hit (the girl with a book)). 
Again, we can account for this by looking at how the logical hypothesis for this sentence is 
built. By the time the addressee encounters with, s/he has the following hypothesis 
available: 
LPLACE ][TIME:t< tu 1 HIT /
 rGIRL-.a 
UPROPERTY Jí 
THING J 
UMANNERJ; 
PREDÍCATE 
UPROPERTY ] } 
L
 PROPOSITION 
([ , 0 H N]) 
1 L THING -I ' 
When the addressee accesses the selection frame of with, s/he will fmd that it introduces a 
PROPERTY involving a THING. This then makes both the optional PROPERTY slots 
(accompanying GIRL and HIT) in the logical hypothesis accessible. Why then would the 
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addressee select the interpretation in (9b)? Concepts do not only give access to their 
selection frames, but also to encyclopaedic information. This means that the addressee has 
access (in principie) to encyclopaedic information for JOHN, HIT and GIRL by the time 
s/he encounters with. For HIT this includes the information that we can hit people with 
some instrument, so that the PROPERTY introduced by with can be accommodated as a 
PROPERTY of HIT. GIRL, on the other hand, does not make accessible any assumptions, 
or assumption schemas which help assign reference to GIRL (since there are no instances 
of the concept GIRL in the immediately accessible context). In order to accommodate the 
PROPERTY as a PROPERTY of GIRL the addressee would have to make extra 
assumptions, which would involve creating a context, which means extending the accessible 
context. Because the addressee aims for the interpretation which involves least processing 
effort, assigning the PROPERTY to the PROPERTY of HIT is the only assignment that the 
addressee can select. This assignment is borne out when the addressee encounters a book. 
If the THING turns out to be incompatible with being an instrument used in hitting, for 
example the blue eyes, this will lead to reanalysis. 
However, this does not mean that when a sentence like (7b) is used as an act of ostensive 
communication, the addressee will always select this analysis first. Altmann & Steedman 
(1988) show that in context the contextually appropriate interpretation is selected for 
sentences such as (7b). We can account for this given the proposal that the addressee 
constructs logical hypotheses which interact with information in the context. For example, 
if fhere are several possible referents for GIRL accessible in the context, then their 
representations will become activated on encountering the girl, without the addressee being 
able to make a choice between them. These representations will include properties of the 
girls which in turn will actívate the PROPERTY slot accompanying GIRL. Then when with 
is encountered this will give further activation to the PROPERTY slot accompanying GIRL, 
thereby making it the most accessible slot, so that the PROPERTY will be assigned to this 
slot, rather than to the optional PROPERTY slot accompanying HIT. 
When subjects process a sentence like (8a) in isolation, they get 'garden-pathed', 
because they take a mile to be the object ofjogs, rather than the subject of the main clause: 
(8a) Since Jay always jogs a mile seems like a short distance to him. 
Jog is ambiguous among a number of different readings, which means that it maps onto 
different concepts, causing the addressee to build different logical hypotheses: 
1. LPLACEJLTIMI¿I < lu J 
LPROPOSITION, 
• J O G ( U H I ) 
{[* : ] } .MANNER 
-PREDÍCATE 
UPROPERTY i) 
EVHNT 
rJAY 
UPROPERTY J ) 
>- THING 
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PROPOSITION2 
^ - r LPLACH JLTIMK: t < tu J 
LPROPOSITION, 
PROPOSITION, 
Because tiie addressee cannot choose between these two hypotñeses at this stage, s/he will 
maintain both. These hypotheses will be processed in parallel, until a choice can be made 
between them. When the addressee encounters the indefinite article a, this will give access 
to the logical selection frames: 
LTIIING J 
(Procedure: créate instance) 
r LPLACF. J ITIME J LEVENT/STATE LPREDICATE JVLTHING _ ])]] l 
L J 
PRoposrnoN 
These selection frames show both that an instance of a THING is following, and what that 
TH1NG has to combine withto yield a PROPOSITION. Why then does the addressee select 
the interpretation of the THING as the direct object, rather than as the subject of the second 
PROPOSITION? As we have seen, the addressee only uses information from both selection 
frames if s/he does not have a logical hypothesis yet, or if the information in the first 
selection frame cannot be fitted into the hypothesis. In this case, the first selection frame 
yields the information that an instance of a THING is following. Although there is no 
THING slot in hypothesis 1, there is in hypothesis 2 into which the instance of THING can 
be fitted. Because the indefinite article signáis that an overt THING is following, and there 
is no comma to indícate that the first proposition is complete, there is no reason for the 
addressee to assume that the THING signalled by the indefinite article should be taken as 
the beginning of the second proposition rather than as the THING following JOG. 
Letus now look at why subjects get 'garden-pathed' with sentences such as (8b): 
(8)(b) The horse raced past the barn fell. 
By üie time the addressee encounters raced, s/he will have the hypothesis: 
- J O G (LTHING: dislanceJ) " 
ILMANNER J } 
- PREDÍCATE 
/ 
\ 
rJAY 
UPROPERTY 
- THING 
UPROPEKl'Y J l 
EVENT 
]} 
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~ LPLACEJLTIME J MEDÍCATE J 
•- EVENT/STATE 
rHORSE-,a 
UPROPERTY i) 
'HING J 
PROPOSITION 
Raced will map onto a number of different concepto. The past reading of (7b) will give 
access to the selection frame RACE1: 
•RACE([PATH])n 
{[MANNER J) 
• PREDÍCATE 
UPROPERTY J ) 
EVENT 
(LTHINGJ ) 
[ LPLACEJLTIME JLF.'V 
PROPOSITION 
] 
The passive reading will give access to the selection frames for RACE2: 
(LTHINGJ ) 
r AT r r (RACE([ T H I N G ] b ) 
UMANNER J j 
PREDÍCATE 
UPROPERTY J } 
!- EVENT 
l-CIRCUMSTANTIAL PLACE 
IPLACE J LTIME J 1 f "h{ LciRCUMSTANTIAL PLACE 
_])-, ([THING]b) -, -, 
LPREDICATE -I 
EVENT 
PROPOSITION 
In principie, the addressee has a choice between fitting RACE, into the PREDÍCATE slot 
in the hypothesis, and fitting RACEj into the PROPERTY slot in the hypothesis. However, 
the PREDÍCATE slot has to be filled with conceptual material in order to yield a 
PROPOSITION, while the PROPERTY slot is an optional slot. This means that the 
PREDÍCATE slot is accessible, while the PROPERTY slot only becomes accessible if the 
addressee recovers a concept which cannot be inserted into a slot which has to be filled in 
order to yield a proposition, or if assumptions in the context make the resulting 
interpretation relevant. In this case, the first selection frame of RACE, can be inserted into 
a slot which has to be filled in order to yield a proposition, and moreover, there are no 
assumptions in the context which make inserting RACEj in the PROPERTY slot of HORSE 
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relevant, so that the addressee will choose the assignment of RACE, to the PREDÍCATE 
slot. 
What we see then is that we can define processing effort not only in relation to contexts, 
but also in relation to logical hypothesis formation and completion. In relation to context 
extensión we saw that the fewer steps of context extensión needed to yield an interpretation 
with adequate contextual effects, the smaller the processing effort; in relation to filling 
conceptual slots in a logical hypothesis we saw that the more accessible a conceptual slot, 
the smaller the processing effort involved in recovering it. In actual utterance interpretation, 
the amount of processing effort involved in computing an interpretation will depend on the 
interaction of these different processes. 
3.3. Múltiple centre-embedded sentences 
Different explanations have been proposed to account for the difficulty of processing 
múltiple centre-embedded sentences, such as: 
(10) The rat the cat the dog bit chased ran away. 
For example, Kimball (1973) proposed seven parsing principies, one of which, the principie 
of New Nodes, explained why deletion of complementizers can make sentences difficult to 
understand: the complementizer signáis that a new phrasal node should be started. 
However, the difficulty in processing sentences like (10) does not seem to be due to the 
absence of complementizers. Newmeyer (1983) points out that múltiple centre-embedded 
constructions which complementisers are unacceptable: 
(11) The cheese that the rat that the cat chased ate was rotten. 
Newmeyer argües that we can explain the unacceptability of múltiple centre-embedded 
sentences by combining the competence model of generative grammar with a model of 
immediate memory storage. However, this proposal does not give us an explanation of why 
the sentence in (10) and (11) are unacceptable, while Smith's (1989) example in (12) is fine, 
even though it has the same múltiple centre-embedded structure: 
(12) The game those boys I met invented resembles chess. 
Moreover, it does not give us an explanation of why there is a gradient of unacceptability, 
so that Smith's (1989) example in (13) is more unacceptable than (10) and (11) even though 
it involves fewer words: 
(13) Oysters oysters oysters split split split. 
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We can explain this phenomenon by looking at what is involved in the interpretation of these 
different sentences, i.e. how the addressee recovers 'who did whatto whom'. As we shall 
see it turns out that the concepts referred to in the different sentences constrain the 
interpretation to a greater or lesser extent. Let us consider (10). On encountering The the 
addressee recovers the selection frame for THE: 
[THING ] 
(Procedure: accessible instance) 
r LPLACE JLTIME JLEVENT/STATELPREDICATE JVLTHING _ J/J "I 
PROPOSITION 
On the basis of this the addressee can set up a hypothesis, into which RAT can be fitted 
next: 
~ LPLACE JLTIME J 
PROPOSITION 
LpREDICATE J 
• EVENT/STATE 
RAT 
UPROPERTY J j 
•-THING 
On encountering the again, the addressee recovers that an accessible instance of a THING 
is following. Because there is no THING slot in the hypothesis, the addressee has to access 
the second selection frame of THE, which shows a PROPOSITION can be formed. Because 
RAT can take a PROPOSITION as a PROPERTY, this information can be fitted into the 
hypothesis. Because this PROPOSITION contains a THING slot, CAT can be fitted into it. 
This process is repeated on encountering the dog, while BITE will be fitted into the raost 
recenüy postulated PREDÍCATE slot. The THING slot following BITE in the hypothesis 
can be filled by CAT, as the CAT is the most accessible THING, by virtue of the 
PROPOSITION being a PROPERTY of the CAT, yielding the following hypothesis: 
LPLACE J LTIMF. J [PREDÍCATE J / r RAT -i a 
[PROPOSITION, ] 
' L THING -
L EVENT/STATE 
L
 PROPOSITION, 
LPLACE JLTIME J LPREDICATE J / T ~* 
[PROPOSITION3 ] 
•EVENT/STATE 
L
 PROPOSITION, 
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[l>LACE J L T I M E -I BITE,rCAT -ib i 
ILTHING-1 ' 
{[MANNER]} 
PREDÍCATE 
{[PROPERTY]} 
EVENT/STATE 
L
 PROPOSITION, 
DOG 
{[PROPERTY]} 
This logical hypothesis presents the addressee with a number of problems. The addressee 
is faced with finding or setting up referents for the 'accessible instances' of RAT, CAT and 
DOG. The PROPOSITION modifying RAT should help the addressee pick out the intended 
referent, but since that PROPOSITION itself contains an accessible instance of CAT, 
finding a referent for RAT becomes dependent on finding a referent for CAT. This is 
repeated in that the PROPOSITION modifying CAT should help the addressee pick out the 
intended referent, but since that PROPOSITION itself contains an accessible instance of 
DOG, finding a referent for CAT is made dependent on finding a referent for DOG. There 
is no dog in the context, ñor does accessing the encyclopaedic entries of RAT, CAT and 
DOG yield any accessible dog, so that the addressee cannot find any referent. 
On encountering chased the addressee has two PREDÍCATE slots available into which 
the concept could be fitted, both of which are equally accessible. Encyclopaedic entries of 
the concepts encountered do not constrainthe interpretation: it could equally well be the cat 
as the rat who did the chasing, and it could even be the dog, performing a number of 
different actions. Moreover, the cat, the rat and the dog could all be chased. When the 
addressee encounters ron away, this could again apply equally well to the cat as the rat, and 
again encyclopaedic entries of the concepts involved do not constrain the interpretation. 
What we see then is that it is not due to the repetition of structurally undifferentiated pirrases 
that the human processor is too confused to cope, as Smith (1989) proposes, but rather that 
this is due to there not being any basis on which to decide what reference should be assigned 
to the different animáis, and to there not being any basis on which to decide what concepts 
should go where in the logical hypothesis. 
When we compare this with the interpretation of (12), a different picture emerges: 
(12) The game those boys I met invented resembles chess. 
Building a logical hypothesis for (12) occurs along the same lines as for (10). The addressee 
is faced with similar problems as in processing (10), in that s/he has to find or set up a 
referent for GAME. The PROPOSITION modifying GAME should help the addressee pick 
out the intended referent, but since that PROPOSITION itself contains BOYS, fmding a 
referent for GAME becomes dependent on finding referents for BOYS. However, from this 
stage the interpretation of (12) differs from that of (10). The PROPOSITION modifying 
BOYS should help the addressee pick out the intended referent, and in this case the 
PROPOSITION does constrain the interpretation of BOYS. In the first place, /maps onto 
114 Revista Alicantina de Estudios Ingleses 
a THING which is constrained by it being the communicator. Tbis means that even when 
(12) is processed in isolation, the addressee can set up a (partial) conceptual representation 
for the THING. Moreover, meet can be easüy disambiguated to MEET THING. Although 
again the THING could be either GAME or BOYS, the addressee can recover that games 
are notusually met by anyone, butthatpeople are, so that the indeterminacy can be resolved 
in iavour of BOYS. This means that the addressee now has a constraint on the interpretation 
of BOYS, namely that the BOYS at stake are boys that the communicator met. When 
INVENT THING is encountered, there are two PREDÍCATE slots available into which it 
could be fítted, and a filler for THING has to be found. However, the addressee can easily 
recover that people are not usually invented, but that they do invent things or ideas, so that 
the indeterminacy can be resolved in favour of BOYS INVENT GAME. This in turn gives 
the addressee a constraint on the interpretation of GAME, namely that the GAME at stake 
is a game invented by the boys that the communicator met. When RESEMBLE THING is 
recovered, there is only one PREDÍCATE slot left into which it can be fitted, which yields 
GAME¡ RESEMBLES THING, and this hypothesis is confirmed by CHESS, since chess 
isa game as well. 
What we see then is that we can account for the differences in processing difficulty of 
múltiple centre-embedded sentences by looking at how the kinds of concepts involved 
together with encyclopaedic information concerning those concepts help or hinder 
completion of the logical hypotheses into a propositional form. 
Conclusión 
Sperber & Wilson (1995: 206) say that they see anticipatory logical hypotheses "as playing 
a crucial role in disambiguation and reference assignment." In this paper it has been shown 
that proposals made by relevance theory can indeed be translated into an account of on-line 
sentence processing. It has been shown how logical hypotheses can be built on-line on the 
basis of information concerning the ways in which concepts can combine to form well-
formed propositional forms. As we have seen, this account makes the right predictions with 
regard to experimental findings concerning ambiguous and 'garden-path' sentences, and 
with regard to múltiple centre-embedded sentences. 
Notes 
1. This does not mean that a speaker always will be optimally relevant, for example a speaker 
may make the wrong assessment of what assumptions are immediately accessible to the 
addressee. 
2. Although Jackendoff's Conceptual Semantics has been criticised for not being able to deal 
with such issues as quantification and scope phenomena, Zwarts & Verkuyl (1994) show that 
Jackendoff's system of representation can be given a model-theoretic treatment. They say about 
this that: "... it turnea out that CS can be interpreted in a way that gives it the same expressive 
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power as a first-order logic with other sorts of entities besides individuáis." (26). 
In this paper 1 will make use of informal representations. 
3. Jackendoff gives verb meanings in terms of lexical decompositions, while relevance theory 
proposes that concepts are simple and unanalyzable. One can adopt Jackendoff's conceptual 
categories without thereby committing oneself to a decompositional view of concepts, as will be 
done here. For a discussion of concepts in relevance theory, see Groefsema (1997). 
4. Square brackets indícate conceptual constituents, while the label indicates the type of 
conceptual category. Curly brackets are used to indicate optional conceptual constituents. 
5. The kind of property that can occur with a particular concept can be specified using 
'assumption schemas' (Sperber & Wilson, 1986). 
6. Because of space constraints, I represent the subordínate PROPOSITION separately. 
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